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Ethics has am'ved in the business school curriculum. But what about the 
cumculum offinance?Can ethics be integratedin anymeaningful wayinto the 
theory and pedagogy of finance? Given the ever-broader array of topics in 
finance, should ethics be includedat the inevitable expense ofsomething else? 
Are finance instructors qualified to teach ethics any more than ethicists are 
qualified to teach finance? In short, are finance educators doing students a 
service or disservice by devoting class time to ethics? These are the questions 
addressedhere. A menu ofthree different levels ofintegration is supplied; each 
level requiring a different commitment ofcurricula resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethics is now a permanent fixture within business-school curricula. Accreditation 
bodies, such as the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), are 
following the lead ofprofessional organizations, such as the Chartered Financial Analyst 
(CFA) Institute, in promoting business ethics education. But the question still remains 
of how best to integrate ethics into the business school curriculum. 
Business schools vary considerably in terms of size, academic focus, and resource 
availability, so a one-size-fits-all answer to this question would be overly simplistic. 
What is clear, however, is that some level of ethics integration is essential given the 
current business and administrative milieu. This article focuses specifically on the 
integration of ethics into the subject area of finance. It begins from the premise that the 
decision has been made to integrate ethics into the finance curriculum. Three levels of 
integration are discussed. 
Integration Level One 
This level requires the minimum commitment necessary to achieve some meaningful 
integration. Students are merely made aware of the fact that finance involves 
assumptions about human behavior and that this behavior is both complex and 
suggestible. 
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Integration Level Two 
This level requires an intermediate resource commitment. Students are assigned cases 
and readings on ethical issues in finance. Class time is devoted to discussion of these cases 
and readings in terms of applying ethics theory to the practice of finance. 
Integration Level Three 
This level requires a significant resource commitment, including modification to the 
curriculum and probably the employment of additional instructors. The finance 
department offers a class specifically on 'Financial Ethics'. 
Which one of these three levels is optimal for any given finance department will 
depend on factors such as the size of the department, the flexibility of the existing 
curriculum, the physical resources available, and -- most critically -- the intellectual 
resources available in the form of faculty willing and able to devote time to the coverage 
ofethics. The three levels ofintegration, therefore, represent three levels ofdepartmental 
commitment to the integration of ethics into the subject area of finance. The remainder 
of this article fleshes out each of these integration levels. 
INTEGRATION LEVEL ONE 
Concisely defined, ethics is the study of the best justification for action. Thus ethics 
is the normative (i.e., prescriptive) study of rationality. At the practical level, a 
knowledge of ethics theory gives individuals the intellectual skills necessary to best 
answer the question, 'What should I do?' This question is ofcourse faced continually by 
any rational individual in many circumstances, including business circumstances, where 
more than one course of action is available (what game theorists call a "decision node"). 
Any normal life, particularly any normal life in business, is a mass of sequential decision 
nodes. 
Answering this question, 'What should I do?' is not simple; two-thousand years of 
moral philosophy attests to this. And clearly a typical finance class is not a suitable venue 
for an elucidation of this philosophy. But merely making students aware of the fact that 
this is a question to which they should devote serious thought -- i.e., they are not 'hard­
wired' to act in any particular way -- is a significant contribution to the introduction of 
ethics into finance. This represents LevelOne Integration. The critical first question that 
any finance educator must address, therefore, is how far to go: How much time is going 
to be devoted to elucidating this ethical aspect of finance? 
To some extent this will depend on the type ofmaterial being covered in the finance 
class. If the material is largely technical in nature with little to no bearing on human 
behavior -- i.e., on the question 'What should I do?' -- then a discussion of ethics is 
inappropriate. But if the material does address behavior then a discussion of the 
justification for the behavioral choices -- i.e., a discussion ofethics -- is very appropriate. 
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Traditionally, finance has taken a pretty simplistic view ofhuman behavior. Agents 
were personal wealth maximizing opportunists. Hence the heavy promotion of 
performance based incentive schemes as a means of aligning this self interest of agents 
with that of principals. 
More recently, however, behavioral finance has questioned this notion ofrationality 
as opportunistic wealth maximization. Researchers have found that human behavior, 
even in financial contexts, is actually far more complex and suggestible than traditional 
agency theory would imply. Specifically, not only do people behave in complex and 
unpredictable ways but also -- and this is crucial to our present discussion -- people's 
behavior is malleable and open to suggestion: people behave in ways that they are told 
to behave, or in ways that they think they are supposed to behave, or in ways in which 
they observe their peers behaving. In short, contrary to the assumptions of traditional 
agency theory, opportunistic wealth maximization is not a law of nature. 
Lesson Plan 
What follows is a suggested framework for introducing ethical issues into a finance 
class. This plan is condensed from Chapters One, Two, and Three of Finance Ethics: The 
RationalityofVirtue (1997). It approaches ethics from the perspective of agency theory, 
and is intended to provide finance instructors with the minimum tools necessary to 
conduct a meaningful discussion of ethics in finance. 
The business environment _~ as viewed through the lens of conventional finance 
--comprises a complex web ofinterrelated interest groups, each distinguishable by their 
unique set of objectives and constraints. Indeed, since the pioneering work of Robert 
Coase on The Nature ofThe Finn (1937), corporations have been viewed as mechanisms 
for minimizing the costs and maximizing the efficiency of these contractual relations or 
agency problems. Although contractual agreements between stakeholders take on many 
forms, a general distinction can be made between explicit contracts and implicit 
contracts. 
Explicit Contracts 
Broadly defined, explicit contracts are those that appear in writing and lend 
themselves to legal enforcement (albeit at a cost). Examples of such contracts are 
bondholder covenants, union wage contracts, product warranties, and shareholder-voting 
rights. There are three basic problems with explicit contracts: 
1) Feasibility: The intangible nature of a business arrangement may simply make an 
explicit contract unfeasible. 
2) Cost: Even if theoretically feasible, an explicit contract may be prohibitively 
expensive given legal fees and other documentation costs. 
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3) Enforceability: Any explicit contract is binding only if it is recognized as being 
enforceable. If those bound by the contract do not feel that the contract is 
enforceable, then they will feel free to breach it with impunity. Therefore, no matter 
how well it is drawn up, the contract will have little practical value. 
Implicit Contracts 
Because of the above problems, much financial interaction relies on implicit 
contracts. Implicit contracts do not readily lend themselves to legal enforcement; they 
are "too nebulous and state-contingent to reduce to writing at reasonable cost" (Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987, p. 6). Examples of implicit contracts are many and varied. The most 
common include a producer's commitment to product quality, a stockbroker's 
commitment to execute a client's security transaction at the best available price, or 
management's commitment to act in the interests of shareholders. The analysis of 
implicit contracts in finance generally comes under the nomenclature of agency theory. 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory analyzes situations in which "one or more persons (the principal(s» 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
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Figure 2. Informational Asymmetry 
OUTSIDE
 
SHAREHOLDER
 
(~~~IDE ~
 ~AGEMENT
 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent" (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p. 308). These situations take on many forms in finance. Some of the most common 
would include the following: 
PRINCIPAL AGENT 
shareholder manager 
bondholder manager 
shareholder board of directors 
board of directors manager 
investor market analyst 
investor stock broker 
These agency relations can be loosely categorized into two types: adverse selection 
and moral hazard. The difference between these two categories is essentially a function 
of the nature and degree of uncertainty inherent in the contractual situation. 
Adverse Selection 
In adverse selection, the uncertainty stems from an asymmetry of information that 
precludes the principal from costlessly identifying the type of agent. Asymmetry of 
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information is common in agency relations. The classic such relation in finance is that 
of managers and shareholders (see Figure 2): shareholders may be unable to costlessly 
determine the true earnings expectations of managers. 
For example, consider two firms: "Good" and "Bad." The Good firm has relatively 
superior future earnings prospects, whereas the bad firm has relatively inferior future 
earnings prospects. The firms cannot choose whether they are goodor bad(formally, the 
agent's type is exogenously determined). Furthermore, the different earnings prospects 
of the two firms are not readily apparent from their financial statements or other 
generally available information. Thus the contractual environment is one characterized 
by informational asymmetry: the agents (i.e., the insiders or managers of the firm) know 
more about their respective firm's prospects than do the principals (i.e., the outside 
investors). 
The ability of the principals to make optimal (i.e., wealth maximizing) investment 
decisions is a function of their ability to distinguish between the Good firm and the Bad 
firm. Thus the agency problem stems directly from the informational asymmetry. Since 
a firm's type is not directly observable, principals attempt to make inferences from signals 
emitted-either advertently or inadvertently-by the firms. For example, the Good firm 
might consistently pay a large cash dividend that the Bad firm cannot afford to imitate 
given its inferior earnings. 
Equilibria 
If the Good agent is able to devise and emit an effective signal, then it engenders 
what agency theorists term a separating equilibrium in which the two agents become 
distinguishable to principals and thus the informational asymmetry is overcome. Ifsuch 
a signal does not exist, then the informational asymmetry endures and a pooling 
equilibrium ensues: 
- Separating Equilibrium: The principal is able to discern the different types of 
agent, whether the agent is the manager of the Good or Bad firm. 
- Pooling Equilibrium: The undesirable outcome from the principal's perspective in 
which the principal is unable to distinguish the agent's type. 
Even if a separating equilibrium is achieved, note that there are generally costs 
involved. A successful signal, whether it be a large dividend payout or some other, can 
often be costly for the agent to emit. If the signal is not costly, then it is something the 
"Bad" agent might easily be able to mimic. In other words, if there had been no initial 
informational asymmetry or if the Bad agent chose to honestly reveal its type, then the 
Bad agent would often be no worse off and the Good agent would be better off through 
not having to fund the signal. 
Formally, the separating equilibrium is said to be second best because there is a 
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deadweight or 'dissipative' cost levied on the economy in aggregate (a cost to one agent 
not recouped by the other agent or the principal). Thus agency problems, even ifthey are 
overcome, are not zero-sum games. Weare not dealing merely with a redistribution of 
wealth from principal to agent, but rather with an absolute wealth loss to the economy 
in aggregate. 
Moral Hazard 
If each agent above could be relied upon to honestly reveal its type, then the 
informational asymmetry would disappear and a separating equilibrium would be 
attained without the need for costly signals. But inferior agents may well have 
motivations to mimic superior agents and thus perpetuate the agency problem. This 
temptation on the part of the agent to act in his or her own interest rather than in the 
interests of the principal is termed moral hazard. Thus every situation of adverse 
selection contains at its heart the problem of moral hazard. As such, moral hazard 
represents the fundamental behavioral dilemma of agency theory, and indeed the 
fundamental behavioral dilemma of financial economics. Thus even if informational 
asymmetry is minimal, there may still be a significant agency problem in the form of 
moral hazard: basic conflict of interest. 
The classic agency problem of this type is managerial perquisite consumption. As a 
firm moves from private to public ownership, there is a separation of ownership and 
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control. The owners bear the cost of managers' perquisite consumption (e.g., business 
lunches, corporate jets, etc.) but the managers make the decisions on how many "perks" 
to consume. Barring effective accountability-in other words barring a resolution to the 
agencyproblem-a "rational" wealth-maximizingmanagement, who no longer bears the 
full cost of its perks, may be predisposed to consume perks to an excessive degree. to a 
degree that compromises the value of the firm as a whole. Potential shareholders and 
bondholders, cognizant of management's "rational" predisposition, will lower the price 
at which they are willing to buy the firm's equity or debt. 
This agency problem of moral hazard is illustrated by the game tree in Figure 3, 
which depicts a simple conflict of interest between two players: A and B. PlayerA might 
represent a group of shareholders considering an investment in a company whose 
management is represented by player B. David Kreps summarizes the game's playas 
follows: 
First A must choose whether or not to trust his opponent. Ifhe (A) elects not to trust 
B, then both A and B get nothing. If he elects trust, B is made aware of this fact and 
is given the option either to honor that trust or to abuse it. IfA trusts B and she (B) 
chooses to honor that trust, both get $10. But if A trusts B and she chooses to abuse 
it, B gets $15 and A loses $5. (1984, p. 12) 
Assume that each player's payoff from the game is common knowledge. In other 
words there is no informational asymmetry and to the extent that there is an agency 
problem it would be characterized as one of simple moral hazard. As Kreps explains, the 
game begins with player A deciding whether or not to trust player B. If he (A) does 
decide to trust B, then she (B) must decide whether to honor or abuse that trust. 
Those of you familiar with Game Theory will recognize Figure 5 as a one-sided 
version of the infamous Prisoners' Dilemma game. Ifwe assume that both players are 
rational in the financial-economic sense, and thus are primarily motivated to maximize 
their payoff, then presumably, if called upon to move, Bwill abuse the trust vested in her 
by A. Realizing this, A will never offer trust, and a contract between these two players 
will not be entered into. The most reasonable outcome for this game, therefore, is for 
each player to receive a payoff of $0. 
However, such an outcome is clearly not the most desirable, either from the point 
of view of the two players as individuals or from the point of view of the economy as a 
whole, in that the maximum total payoff of $20 is not attained (this would be the first­
best outcome). The unwillingness ofplayer A to trust player Bhas cost both players $10. 
But then why should B honor trust if her immediate payoff is maximized by abusing it? 
And whatever B might actually plan on doing, why should A assume that B is going to 
honor trust when he can see that abusing it yields her the higher payoff? 
How can this desirable outcome, based on mutual trust, be reached? Given these 
economically 'rational' agents, there is only one way it can be reached: through a 
predisposition on the part of player B to build and maintain a reputation. 
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The Reputation Solution 
Reputation-building behavior involves the sacrifice of short-run income in the 
expectation of greater long-run income. In Figure 3, for example, player B will sacrifice 
$5 per play ofthe game in order to maintain her reputation for honoring trust. She would 
rationally do this in order to induce the principal to offer trust in future plays of the 
game. Reputation, therefore, would appear to remedy the fundamental agency problem. 
But just how reliable is this reputation solution? 
Conditions Necessary for Reputation to Work 
Condition 1: Compliance with contracts is value-enhancing for agents. 
Condition 1 has been made implicitly in the discussion of the previous sections. 
Clearly, for reputation to be valued, the enforcement of contracts must in some way 
contribute to the maximization of agents' objective function. 
Condition 2: Agents are sequentially rational, ie., memoryand learning exist. 
A sequentially rational agent has two notable attributes: a multi-period objective 
function and a strategy that can be modified in light of new information. Therefore, in 
a contractual environment characterized by sequential reality, an agent's strategy is 
flexible and dependent upon previous experiences. For reputation to work, this type of 
rationality is clearly essential because if agents had no memory, or if they did not modify 
behavior on the basis of this memory, reputation would be meaningless. 
Condition 3: Agents operate in a supergame environment. 
A supergame is a series of contractual situations, i.e., sub-games like Figure 3, linked 
by the participation of a common agent. In the case of reputation building, the common 
agent who endures throughout the supergame must be the reputation builder. For 
example, repetitions of the game depicted in Figure 3, in which player B endures, would 
be a suitable supergame. There may be many player A's as long as each can observe the 
previous players' experiences, and thus learn from them. 
The agent building the reputation (player B in Figure 3) must also believe that the 
supergame is either of infinite duration, or that there is some uncertainty over whether 
or not the supergame is infinite, or that there is some uncertainty over the agent's 
rationality. If a supergame is of known finite duration, then a simple argument reveals 
that the game collapses into a single-play environment: on the last iteration of the 
supergame, both players know that the agent will abuse trust, thus the principal will not 
offer trust; consequently, the agent will rationally renege on the penultimate iteration. 
Knowing this, the principal will not offer the contract on the penultimate repetition, 
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etc. The game unravels with no reputation effect. 
Condition 4: The behavioral trait upon which contractual enforcement rests (and for 
which the reputation is built) is observable ex-post by the principal, but not costIessly 
venfiable. 
Condition 4's rationale becomes apparent if extreme scenarios are considered. A firm 
endeavoring to build a reputation for timely debt repayment behavior would be unwise 
to issue twenty-year, zero-coupon-rate bonds. If it were to do so, the firm would clearly 
not start building its reputation for twenty years, since its ability to repay the debt would 
not be tested until then. Contrarily, if the firm were to issue coupon-paying debt (or 
short-term, zero-coupon debt) its reputation could be built considerably faster. Similar 
logic has been applied in the context of reputation's ability to distinguish superior 
mutual-fund performance: "since the amount of time it takes to discern quality of 
portfolio performance is lengthy in financial markets, reputation is unlikely to have 
much substantial basis. Inferior performers should survive for a long time, as is consistent 
with empirical evidence" (Dybvig and Spatt, 1985, p. 4). 
At the other extreme, if contracts are costlessly verifiable, then explicit enforcement 
would be costless and reputation's role as an enforcer of implicit contracts would be 
trivial. Thus reputation clearly requires the existence of at least some simple moral­
hazard-type market imperfection as is the case, for example, in Figure 3. 
Reputation and Adverse Selection 
Conditions 3 and 4 above imply that, when valuing an implicit claim, the principal 
should consider the strategy of the claim seller, i.e., the agent. Ifit appears probable that 
the agent believes the supergame is near termination (e.g., the agent is soon to retire or 
shift geographical location), then the principal should exercise caution when purchasing 
implicit claims valued on the basis of the agent's reputation. 
Similarly, if the principal believes that the fundamental tenets of a supergame 
environment do not apply unambiguously to the claim in question, then caution must 
again be exercised in valuing that claim. For example, a reputable small-town auto 
mechanic may have little incentive to maintain her reputation while working on an out­
of-state car that she believes is just passing through town (at least this is true within the 
finance paradigm, we ignore for now the idea that this mechanic may feel some moral 
compunction to service the car well). In this situation, Condition 3 is clearly breached: 
the principal (transient car owner) will be unable to pass on his opinion of the repair 
work to future principals (i.e., future auto-repair customers). 
Condition 4 requires that the behavioral trait for which the agent builds a reputation 
be observable after the fact. Thus, in an environment characterized by informational 
asymmetry, the principal should be wary of reading too much into the agent's 
reputational signal. Reputation, therefore, may have little power to enforce contracts in 
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environments characterized by adverse selection. Imagine a modified Figure 3 in which 
the informational asymmetry takes the form of the principal being unable to observe the 
payoff matrix. In this situation ofadverse selection, the agent (player B) would be unable 
to build a reputation because the principal would be unable to determine whether or not 
she was "honoring trust." 
The Decision to Build a Reputation 
In balance sheet terms, a firm's reputation at any time can be viewed as both an asset 
and a liability. On the asset side is the increased value of the implicit claims sold by the 
firm now and in the future. While on the liability side is the present value of honoring 
these claims in the future. For example, consider a durable-good producer that has built 
a reputation for superior post-sales service. The present value of the price premiums that 
the firm receives on sales of its product as a result of the reputation would be an asset. 
While the liability would be the present value ofthe cost ofproviding superior after-sales 
service in the future. Thus our discussion so far has identified four key characteristics of 
a corporate reputation: 
I) A firm can have several reputations for different attributes, not to mention the 
reputations of individuals within the firm that may be distinct from the overall firm 
reputation. 
2) A firm builds a reputation by demonstrating a consistent mode of behavior to its 
stakeholders (e.g., customers, creditors, shareholders, etc.). 
3) The building or maintaining of a reputation can require net expenditures in the 
short-run, presumably in the expectation of net revenues in the long-run. Thus the 
decision whether to build or maintain a reputation at any time can essentially be viewed 
as a capital budgeting decision. 
4) A firm's reputation can act as an implicit contractual enforcement mechanism: 
An agent's long-term desire to maintain its reputation may induce it to act in the interest 
of the principal in the short-term. 
These four characteristics, in turn, prompt the following definition of a corporate 
reputation: 
A reputation is a behavioral trait. A firm builds a reputation by demonstrating a 
consistent mode ofbehavior through a series ofcontractual situations. Once buik a 
reputation increases the valueofimplicitclaimssoldbythe firm to stakeholders. Thus 
a firm's desire to earn future profits by maintaining its reputation may act as an 
implicit contractual enforcement mechanism. 
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For example, a firm with a reputation for creditworthiness will be able to sell its 
subordinated debt at a premium compared to less reputable firms. This premium 
represents the value of an implicit claim. By paying the premium creditors buy an 
implicit claim that the reputable firm will make timely interest and principal payments 
(assuming that, in the event of default, these creditors would be unable to recoup their 
losses from the residual assets of the firm, thus making their claim explicit). Mortgage­
bond holders, on the other hand, need not be as concerned with the firm's reputation for 
creditworthiness because their claim is explicit: in any outcome they recoup their 
investment. 
The Power of Reputation 
But, from a practical perspective, how powerful a force is reputation in 
contemporary business environments? Can a manager's desire to build or maintain a 
reputation be relied upon consistently to enforce business contracts? If it can, then there 
seems little need to consider other non-material, opportunism-based notions of 
rationality: the ill effects of opportunism will be successfully reined in by agents' desire 
to build and maintain their reputations. There will be little or no need for ethics, or more 
precisely an intrinsic commitment to honor trust, as a constraint on behavior. 
Sadly, one does not have to look far to find ample evidence that reputation is not 
enough: as a solution to agency problems, the "reputation solution" is no solution. Enron, 
World-Com, and Tyco represent just the tip of the agency-problem ice berg. One only 
needs to read the financial press or flip through a business-ethics casebook to find many 
similar scenarios. In all of these cases, implicit contracts were not adequately enforced 
by the desire ofagents to preserve either their own reputations or the reputation of their 
firm. The economic mechanism of reputation is not enough. Financial-economic 
rationality does not naturally result in optimal equilibria, what economists call "first­
best" outcomes. Regardless of what happens in reality, even in finance theory there is 
room for ethics. 
Thus ethical behavior among participants in a financial contracting situation can be 
viewed as a type of implicit contractual enforcement mechanism. Note that ethical 
behavior - such as 'honoring trust' in Figure 3 - is not irrational or suboptimal since it 
leads to a stable cooperative equilibrium between principal and agent. Of course this 
ethical equilibrium relies on the principal 'trusting' the agent to cooperate. And indeed 
this is the ethics challenge in business: to instill honest and trustworthy behavior among 
market participants. If this challenge is met, then it's a win-win situation; both principal 
and agent flourish in a self-perpetuating cooperative relation. 
LEVEL TWO INTEGRATION 
Instructors who adopt level one integration will make their students aware of the 
fact that ethical value judgments are unavoidable in finance. The next logical step is to 
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provide students with some practical guidance on how to make the bestdecision in any 
given situation. This can be achieved in two stages. 
First, students must have some background in basic ethics theory. They may already 
have this background from a class in business ethics or moral philosophy, but to ensure 
they have the necessary intellectual tools to make sound moral judgments the instructor 
could assign some basic readings on ethics theory. Chapters Four, Five, and Six ofFinance 
Ethics: The Rationality ofVirtue provides a summary of basic ethics theory as it relates 
to finance. 
Second, assign finance case studies that will enable the students to apply the ethics 
theory to specific decision situations in finance. Many case sources are available (see, for 
example, http://www.ibe.org.ukl). The instructor may choose to make up his or her own 
case vignettes (see Appendix One for an example). Or some already assigned finance cases 
that involve behavioral choices could be discussed from the perspective of ethics. For 
example, Robert F. Bruner's Case Studiesin Finance (2002) text provides many ostensibly 
finance cases that can also be viewed from an ethics perspective. In this context, see also 
Hess and Strands, "Teaching Ethics in Investment Classes: A Series of case Vignettes" 
(2004). 
LEVEL THREE INTEGRATION 
My finance department offers a class entitled "Ethics and Behavioral Finance". The 
class is devoted entirely to an analysis ofthe behavioral foundations offinance from both 
a normative and positive perspective. The offering of this type of class represents level 
three integration. 
This level of commitment to financial ethics obviously involves a significant 
departmental resource allocation. Appendix Two is the syllabus for the class mentioned 
above. Other instructors may choose different approaches. But whatever the approach 
chosen, the class should benefit from the ever-broader literature on behavioral finance, 
business ethics, and indeed financial ethics, as reflected in the assigned readings of the 
syllabus in Appendix Two. 
CONCLUSION 
This article begins from the premise that there should be some integration ofethics 
into the finance curriculum. Three possible levels of integration are presented, each 
requiring a progressively greater commitment of departmental resources. 
Level One Integration merely makes students aware of the normative content of the 
behavioral assumptions that underlie finance pedagogy. Level Two Integration builds on 
level one by ensuring students have a grounding in ethics theory, and by applying that 
theory to specific decision situations in finance. Level Three Integration requires the 
greatest commitment of departmental resources. It involves establishing a course 
specifically on financial ethics. 
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APPENDIX ONE Nowplease answer the fol1owin~ 
WORKSHOP ON FINANCIAL ETHICS 1) Which type of funds will )
or Income Funds? Why; please b 
WELCOME:Pleasereadthe following case vignette carefully; then answerthe questions 2) Regardless of your answebelow briefly in the spaceprovided 
'wrong' with recommending the
reasoning or on economic reasonYou recently landed your dream job. You are working as a junior financial planner
for Smith and Jones Wealth Management Inc., the largest financial planning firm in SLO 3) As you may know, the ~
county. investigated broker behavior, aneYou currently have several clients, mostly elderly retired, and your job is to advise brokers were actually recommen4them on the best investment vehicles in which they should invest their savings. are one ofthese brokers, and that;Mostly you recommend mutual funds, which are diversified pools ofstocks. Mutual might you try to justify your chofunds are currently the most popular type of investment vehicle in the United States.
Currently you deal with two basic types of mutual fund. Growth Funds, which can 4) Returning to your answerbe risky in the sense that returns generally vary over time, but they offer the chance of your education or personal life dihigh returns in some years; or Income Funds, which are less volatile but offer returns

that just match market averages.
 Thank-you for participating in cGiven that your clients are elderly and thus rely on investment returns for a steady answer these last few questions. fincome, the rule-of-thumb implies that they should be in less risky investments, namely to turn this in on your way out; "Income Funds. Also, given that Income Funds are more passively managed they tend to
charge lower fees, thus they are slightly cheaper for the client. 5) Has our discussion today aSo, all else being equal, this sounds like a no brainer. Put your clients in the Income Income versus Growth Fund, andFunds. But all else is not equal. Unlike the Income Funds, the Growth Funds offer what
is generally called 'directed brokerage'. 6) In light of our discussion, 1Directed brokerage is a sales commission that the Growth Funds will pay you for a financial planner? To whom doputting your client in their fund. This also partly explains why the fee charged to your
client is higher for the Growth Funds: your client is basically paying an extra fee to you 7) Why do you think it is tlwhen they pay the higher commission fee to the Growth Fund. Ofcourse the client does 'Growth Fund' in the 'real world"
not know this, unless you choose to tell them.
So, in making your choice ofwhich fund to recommend to your clients you are faced

with a dilemma; what economists call a 'conflict of interest'. Unless you and the client
just happen to get lucky and the Growth Funds do well, rule-of-thumb would indicate

that the client is better served by you putting them in the Income Funds: the Income

Funds charge the client lower fees and offer a more stable return over time.

But you personally will make more money by recommending the Growth Funds. A

large part of your income comes from commissions, and you can virtually double your

commission income in anyone year by consistently recommending Growth Funds over

Income Funds. SLO county is an expensive area and you're struggling to buy a house.

You'd also really like to buy a more prestigious car to go with your 'professional' status.
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1) Which type of funds will you recommend to your elderly clients, Growth Funds 
or Income Funds? Why; please be as specific as possible. 
2) Regardless of your answer to Question 1, what exactly do you think would be 
'wrong' with recommending the other type of fund? Is your answer based on moral 
reasoning or on economic reasoning? 
3) As you may know, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently 
investigated broker behavior, and found that -- in the language of our scenario -- many 
brokers were actually recommending the Growth Funds to elderly clients. Imagine you 
are one ofthese brokers, and that you are being interviewed by an SEC investigator. How 
might you try to justify your choice of the Growth Fund? 
4) Returning to your answer to Question 1. What, if any, general principles from 
your education or personal life did you use as guidance in making your choice? 
Thank-you for participating in our (sadly all too brief) discussion today. Now please 
answerthese last few questions. You mayleave when you're finished. Please don't forget 
to turn this in on your way out; and Thanks again for Coming! 
5) Has our discussion today altered or modified in any way your original choice of 
Income versus Growth Fund, and the reasons for your choice. 
6) In light of our discussion, how would you define your 'professional' obligation as 
a financial planner? To whom do you owe your primary obligation, and why? 
7) Why do you think it is that the SEC identified so many brokers choosing the 
'Growth Fund' in the 'real world'? What will you do in the real world? 
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APPENDIX TWO
 
ETHICS AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, SYLLABUS
 
COURSE OBJECTIVE: This course will cover contemporary theoretical and empirical
 
issues in behavioral finance and financial ethics. Topics may include: agency and
 
signaling theory, reputation models, game theory applications, ethics theory and
 
applications in finance. These topics will be applied to realistic situations in financial
 
services, investment banking, securities analysis, etc. This course will also address the
 
content and justification of the Codes of Ethics supplied by the governing bodies of the
 
CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER, and CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYST
 
designations.
 
REQUIRED TEXTS:
 
1) Ethics in Finance, John R. Boatright, (Blackwell, 1999)
 
2) Finance Ethics, John Dobson, (Univ. Press, 1997)
 
3) Ethics and Behavioral Finance, (Readings Packet)
 
COURSE SCHEDULE
 
Module I: THE NOTION OF RATIONALITY IN FINANCE:
 
Week One 9/20 and 9/22: "Within The Finance Paradigm"
 
w i.Dobson, Introduction and Ch.1: "The Finance Paradox"
 
w2.Dobson, Ch.2: "A Contractual Problem"
 
Week Two 9/27 and 9/29:
 
m3.Boatright, pp. 46-52: "Agency Theory"
 
m4.Dobson, Ch. 3: "Is Reputation Enough?"
 
w5.Boatright, pp. 169-182: "The Financial Theory of the firm"
 
MODULE II: EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST THE 'RATIONAL' AGENT.
 
Week Three 10/4 and 10/6:
 
Readings Packet: (All readings from Financial Analysts Journal)
 
m6.Thaler, "The End of Behavioral Finance?"
 
m7.Statman, "Behavioral Finance: Past battles ..."
 
m8.Daniel and Titman, "Market Efficiency in an Irrational World"
 
w9.Nowak and Sigmund, "Cooperation versus Competition"
 
w10.Chan et al., "New Paradigm or Same Old Hype .."
 
Week Four 10/11 and 10/13: (All readings from Financial Analysts Journal)
 
ml.Raghibur and Das, "A Case for Theory-Driven Experimental Enquiry"
 
m2.scott et aI., "Behavioral Bias, Valuation, and Active Management"
 
w3.Statman, "Socially Responsible Mutual Funds"
 
w4.Hirschey, "How 'Foolish' Are Internet Investors?"
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MODULE III: ALTERNATIVE NC 
Week Five 10/18 and 10/20: Mode 
m5.Boatright, Ch. 1, "Financial Eth 
m6.Boatright, pp. 53-61 "Philosopl 
w7.Boatright, pp. 182-198, "Ethical 
Week Six 10/25 and 10/27: Classic: 
m8.Dobson, Ch. 7, "Which Ratione 
m9.Dobson, Ch. 8, "Practical Ratio 
w10.Dobson, Ch. 10, "Toward a NE 
MODULE IV: PRACTICAL IMPL 
Week Seven 11/1 and 1113: 
m1, m2, m3.CERTIFIED FINAN( 
ANALYST(Grp. 2), and CHARTEF 
content and justification. 
w4.Boatright, Ch. 3, "Ethical Issue: 
w5.Boatright, Ch. 4, "Ethical Issue: 
w6.Boatright, Ch. 5, "Ethical Issue: 
Week Eight 11/8 and 11/10: 
m7.Dobson, Ch. 4, "Toward ReCOIl 
m8.Dobson, Ch. 5, "Ethics in Final 
w9.Dobson, Ch. 6, "Some Intemat 
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 9, "Some Gendel 
REFERENCES 
Bruner, Robert, 2002, Case Studie; 
Coase, R. H. 1937 "The Nature of t 
in Readings in Price Theory, 
Cornell, B. and A. C. Shapiro; 191 
Financial Management, Vol 1 
Dobson, John, 1997, FinanceEthic. 
and Littlefield. 
Dybvig, P. H., and C. S. Spatt. 198~ 
of Organization and Manager 
Hess and Strand, 2004, "Teaching. 
Joumal ofFinancial Educatio. 
Jensen, M. c., and W. H. Meckl 
Agency Costs and OwnershiF 
4 (October, 1976) pp. 305-36< 
Kreps, D.; 1984 "Corporate Cultur 
Paper. 
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MODULE III: ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF RATIONALITY 
Week Five 10/18 and 10/20: Modem Ethics Theory 
m5.Boatright, Ch. 1, "Financial Ethics: An Overview" 
m6.Boatright, pp. 53-61 "Philosophical Ethics" 
w7.Boatright, pp. 182-198, "Ethical Implications" 
Week Six 10/25 and 10/27: Classical (Post-modem) Ethics theory 
m8.Dobson, Ch. 7, "Which Rationality?" 
m9.Dobson, Ch. 8, "Practical Rationality" 
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 10, "Toward a New Finance Paradigm". 
MODULE IV: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS IN FINANCE 
Week Seven 11/1 and 11/3: 
m1, m2, m3.CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER(Grp. 1), CHARTERED FINANCIAL 
ANALYST(Grp. 2), and CHARTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT(Grp. 3); Codes of ethics, 
content and justification. 
w4.Boatright, Ch. 3, "Ethical Issues in Financial Services" 
w5.Boatright, Ch. 4, "Ethical Issues in Investment Decisions" 
w6.Boatright, Ch. 5, "Ethical Issues in Financial Markets" 
Week Eight 11/8 and 11/10: 
m7.Dobson, Ch. 4, "Toward Reconciling Ethics and Finance" 
m8.Dobson, Ch. 5, "Ethics in Financial Practice" 
w9.Dobson, Ch. 6, "Some International Implications" 
wlO.Dobson, Ch. 9, "Some Gender Implications" 
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